Home » The flaws at the heart of the government’s housing policy

The flaws at the heart of the government’s housing policy

Spanish Socialist PM Pedro Sánchez defending his housing policy on national TV.

Socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez recently appeared on television defending rent controls and greater government intervention in Spain’s housing market. His interview on La Revuelta brought several questionable arguments and important omissions into focus. Here’s a closer look.

With Spain heading towards a general election on 29 November, Sánchez is seeking to make housing a central issue. After eight years in power, his government faces criticism over worsening affordability and insufficient housebuilding.

In an interview on La Revuelta on 22 October, Sánchez argued that Spain needs both more construction and greater regulation. He described them as the two pedals of a bicycle.

But his defence of that approach raises some awkward questions.

1. The property bubble supposedly disproves supply and demand

Sánchez argued that Spain built 4.5 million homes before the financial crisis, yet house prices continued rising. He suggested that the relationship between supply and demand was therefore not so straightforward.

The same argument appears in the preamble to the government’s housing decree of 6 October, which notes that more than 3.5 million homes were built in five years without containing prices.

But this was a speculative bubble, fuelled by excessive credit and expectations of ever-rising prices. Construction and prices were both responding to extraordinary speculative demand.

The fact that prices rose whilst supply increased doesn’t demonstrate that additional supply was ineffective. Prices might have risen even faster without it.

It’s rather like arguing that because tulip prices rose during the Dutch speculative mania of the 1630s, growing more tulips doesn’t help contain their price.

The last property bubble illustrates how speculative demand can overwhelm supply, not that the laws of supply and demand cease to apply.

2. Barcelona as a rent-control success story

Sánchez held up Barcelona, where rent controls apply, as an example of rents rising much more slowly than Madrid, where they don’t.

There is evidence of greater price restraint in Barcelona. According to the Generalitat’s official rental-contract figures, the average monthly rent on new contracts was €1,137 in Q1 2026, down 4.7% from immediately before the controls began in 2024, though up 4.6% year-on-year.

But prices are only part of the story. What about availability?

The number of new rental contracts signed in Barcelona fell from 53,524 in 2018 to 30,789 in 2025, a decline of 42.5%. Even comparing Q1 2026 with Q1 2024, new contracts were down 17%.

Fewer new contracts do not necessarily mean fewer homes in the total rental stock. Longer tenancies also reduce turnover. But they do mean fewer opportunities for people looking for somewhere to rent.

Rent controls can protect sitting tenants whilst making life harder for newcomers competing for the limited number of homes becoming available.

Sánchez mentioned the restrained prices, but not the collapse in new contracts.

3. A million new homes built?

Sánchez also claimed that one million homes had been built in recent years, with around 13% classified as protected housing.

He didn’t specify which years. According to official figures examined by fact-checking organisation Newtral, Spain completed approximately 722,000 homes between 2018, when Sánchez came to power, and Q1 2026.

The distinction matters when assessing a government’s record on construction, particularly when housing supply is one of the central issues in the election campaign.

4. A market that supposedly needs more intervention

Sánchez repeatedly argued that the housing market wasn’t working and therefore needed greater public intervention.

But Spain’s housing market is already heavily regulated. Planning restrictions, lengthy administrative procedures and construction requirements constrain development, whilst rental legislation governs prices, contract terms and landlords’ rights.

The question is not simply whether intervention is needed, but whether existing intervention is contributing to the problems the government wants to solve.

A market struggling to respond to demand does not necessarily need more regulation. It might need some of the existing obstacles removed.

5. Two pedals pulling in different directions?

Sánchez’s bicycle analogy sounds reasonable: build more homes whilst regulating the market.

But construction and rental investment depend on expected returns, costs and risks. Regulations that make projects less viable or reduce returns can discourage the very investment needed to increase supply.

Barcelona’s requirement to reserve 30% of certain new developments for protected housing illustrates the difficulty. Introduced in 2018, it has produced far fewer protected homes than originally expected, and even the Socialist-led city council has sought to make the rules more flexible.

Sánchez also argued that his government supports small landlords through tax incentives, whilst directing its criticism towards large investors and so-called vulture funds.

The incentives exist. But the relevant question is whether they outweigh the additional costs, restrictions and risks of renting out a property. That matters in a market where individual owners account for the overwhelming majority of privately rented homes.

What the interview leaves unanswered

There are legitimate arguments for protecting tenants, restraining rents and expanding affordable housing. But the benefits of intervention need to be weighed against its effects on supply, investment and access for prospective tenants.

The interview emphasised construction and regulation as complementary solutions, yet gave little attention to the possibility that some regulations make additional housing less likely to materialise.

Nor did it adequately distinguish the speculative excesses of the 2000s from today’s shortage of homes.

With this sort of reasoning informing housing policy, it’s hardly surprising that Spain’s housing crisis has deteriorated during Sánchez’s eight years in power. I sometimes wonder whether a Socialist government with an absolute majority of its own would have taken a more pragmatic approach, rather than being pulled further towards intervention by its partners on the hard left, who’ve made housing their signature issue. But without a majority of his own, Sánchez remains dependent on those partners to govern. If that arrangement continues, and the underlying thinking doesn’t change, it’s difficult to see Spain’s housing problems getting any better. Indeed, there’s every risk they’ll get worse.